



## SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT REPORT



Incident Commander Battalion Chief James S. Williams  
Officer completing SIR (if different from above)

Incident date 02/18/2011  
Dispatch time 1618 hours  
Incident location 43001 Thornblade Circle

Incident number 201103173  
Box area 23-18

Type of incident as dispatched House Fire  
Actual type of incident (if different from above)  
Number of alarms 1+

### Casualties

	Civilian	Fire Service	Other
Injuries	0	0	0
Fatalities	0	0	0

### Property Loss (determined in conjunction with the FMO)

	Building	Contents	Total
Value	\$350,000	\$250,000	\$600,000
Damages	\$300,000	\$180,000	\$480,000

### Apparatus (understaffed units only)

### Initial Evaluation

E623 arrived on the scene to find a 2-story, single family home with significant fire conditions present from Side Charlie, first and second floor, with extension to the attic. Size up further revealed active fire on both floors one and two of the house.

### Narrative of Operations

E623 arrived on the scene to find a 2-story, single family home with significant fire conditions present from Side Charlie, first and second floor, with extension to the attic. Size up further revealed active fire on both floors one and two of the house.

Upon arrival, E623 OIC established command and initially directed personnel from Company 623 to deploy lines to Side "C" and "D" to initiate defensive operations and to protect the "D" exposure. After an initial knock from the exterior, crews from 6, 23, and 22 initiated an interior attack with two 1-3/4" handlines through the front door on Side "A". Personnel operating on the exterior of the structure continued to protect the "D" exposure with handlines.

BC601 arrived and positioned on his vehicle on Side "C" and began his assessment of the scene as he met up with the E623 OIC to complete a face-to-face assumption of command. BC601 assumed command and set-up the command post in the front yard (Side "A") and operated off of the portable radio.

Soon after the arrival of Tower 619, command ordered an evacuation of the structure after receiving an assessment of the fire conditions from the officer on TL619. On-scene personnel transitioned to a defensive operation until the bulk of the fire was darkened down with the TL619 master stream on Side "C" and a blitz fire through the Side "D" window on floor one; once darkened down, crews were rotated back through the structure to extinguish the remaining pockets of fire and begin salvage and overhaul operations.

Fire also spread into the wooded area on Side "B" of the structure. While there were no homes threatened by the spread of fire in this area, crews needed to be deployed to mitigate it to ensure it didn't spread. Brush 606 was requested to the scene to assist with this exposure so that the box alarm crews could primarily concentrate on the involved structure and "D" exposure.

Class "A" foam was applied during the final stages of overhaul to limit the potential for re-kindle, especially given the forecast for increasing winds throughout the evening.

### **Safety Officer Comments**

\*Personnel should ensure SCBA waist straps are always utilized when the SCBA is utilized.

### Additional Comments

\*Incident Commander did not utilize command vest, which did present some confusion to some personnel arriving at the scene later into the incident.

\*Not all passports were collected at the Command Post, nor did all passports have up-to-date accountability tags present.

\*Given the command post was remote from the vehicle, IC did not have the ability to monitor the Safety Channel ("O") as he did not bring a second portable from the BC buggy prior to leaving it on Side "C".

\*Given the initially limited resources available on scene to establish a robust command staff, BC601 utilized an engine Technician to manage the command board. Officers should drill with subordinate staff to ensure their familiarity with resources, such as the command board, so that they can have a positive impact on an operation, as was the case on this incident.

\*A623-2 was assigned as the IRIT; a formal RIT wasn't established until later into the incident when T606 (add-on) arrived. While the incident commander made a conscious decision to deviate from using the 4<sup>th</sup> arriving engine as RIT, deviations of this nature should only be made when adequate resources are available to immediately fill the void created by same.

\*Personnel from M698 did not appropriately utilize helmet identifiers, which lead to some confusion for the incoming command officers and unit officers as they worked to ensure personnel accountability.

\*E623 OIC initially communicated the incident would be defensive in nature; after an initial defensive attack, he deployed crews to interior operations. This transition to interior/offensive operations wasn't communicated on the radio. Any changes from offensive to defensive (or vice versa) should be verbalized over the radio so all on scene and responding personnel are aware of the tactics being employed.

\*Upon initial arrival on Side "C" of the structure, ER609 blocked TL619 from appropriate positioning. Once ER609 made way for TL619, they should have reverse-laid from the Tower to the hydrant rather than subsequently hand-jacking hose from the hydrant back to the Tower.

\*The 3<sup>rd</sup> arriving engine should have been positioned on Side "C" of the structure; this positioning would have expedited the water supply to Tower 619 and provided for additional handlines for the primary building and/or exposure building. Responding units from the north side of the incident scene accessed the neighborhood from Park Glenn Drive, while units coming from the south utilized Croson Lane and came up upon the incident scene. Using the "Pan Out" feature on the MDC and/or "box area" maps would have provided a better overall picture for the responding personnel. Side "C" access was on Croson Lane which was "outside" the neighborhood.

\*Personnel on-scene incorrectly communicated that the power had been secured early into the incident. It is imperative that transmissions of this nature be accurate as it can affect the safety of personnel operating on scene. As a result of the miscommunication, the power wasn't secured until late into the incident.

On-scene personnel worked very hard and extinguished a large amount of fire found on arrival with little damage to the exposure building; overall, crews did an excellent job while operating on this incident. Further, the initial incident commander (E623 OIC) did an excellent job of reading the fire and deploying resources appropriately, as well as establishing a good command presence. This command presence dictated the tone for a successful operation.

**Attachments**

- ☒ Pictures
- ☒ Diagrams
- ☐ Other































